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Abstract
The most recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa highlighted critical weaknesses in
the medical infrastructure of the affected countries, including effective diagnostics tools,
sufficient isolation wards, and enough medical personnel. Here, we develop and ana-
lyze a mathematical model to assess the impact of early diagnosis of pre-symptomatic
individuals on the transmission dynamics of Ebola virus disease in West Africa in sce-
narios where Ebola may remain at low levels in the population. Our findings highlight
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the importance of implementing integrated control measures of early diagnosis and
isolation. The mathematical analysis shows a threshold where early diagnosis of pre-
symptomatic individuals, combined with a sufficient level of effective isolation, can lead
to an epidemic control of Ebola virus disease. That is, the local erradication of the
disease or the effective management of the disease at low levels of endemicity.
1 Introduction
The Ebola viral strains are re-emerging zoonotic pathogens and members of the Filoviridae
family consisting of five distinct species: Bundibugyo, Cotes d’Ivoire, Reston, Sudan, and
Zaire with a high case-fatality rate in humans [1]. Filoviruses are long filamentous enveloped,
non-segmented, single-stranded viruses, consisting of a negative-sense RNA genome [2]. Each
Ebola species genome encodes seven linearly arranged genes: nucleoprotein (NP), polymerase
cofactor (VP35), matrix protein (VP40), glycoprotein (GP), replication-transcription pro-
tein (VP30), matrix protein (VP24), and RNA-dependent RNA prolymerase (L) [2]. While
there are no proven effective vaccines or effective antiviral drugs for Ebola, containing an
outbreak relies on contact tracing and on early detection of infected individuals for isola-
tion and care in treatment centers [2]. The most recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa,
which began in December 2013, due to the Zaire strain, demonstrated several weaknesses
in the medical infrastructure of the affected countries, including the urgent need of effec-
tive diagnostics, which have a fundamental role in both disease control and case management.
The Ebola virus is transmitted as a result of direct contact with bodily fluids containing
the virus [3]. The virus enters via small skin lesions and mucus membranes where it is able
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to infect macrophages and other phagocytic innate immune cells leading to the production
of a large number of viral particles [2]. The macrophages, monocytes, and dendritic cells
infected in the early stage of the disease serve to spread the virus throughout the organs,
particularly in the spleen, liver, and lymph nodes [2]. Consequently, critically ill patients
display intensive viremia [4]. Recognizing signs of Ebola viral disease is challenging because
it causes common non-specific symptoms such as fever, weakness, diarrhea, and vomiting,
and the incubation period typically lasts 5 to 7 days [3]. Therefore, functioning laborato-
ries and effective point-of-care tests are critically needed in order to minimize transmission,
allow better allocation of scarce healthcare resources, and increase the likelihood of success
of antiviral treatments as they are developed [12]. The puzzling case of Pauline Cafferkey,
crtically ill, months after her recovery from Ebola, points to our lack of full understanding
of Ebola infection and the likelihood of sustainable reservoirs, possible among the recovered.
There is an ongoing effort in place to improve Ebola diagnostics, primarily to detect the
disease early. In our current state, the cost and difficulty of testing limit diagnostic facilities
to small mobile laboratories or centralized facilities with turnaround times measured in days
rather than in a few hours, meaning that diagnosis is largely used to confirm disease. Ebola
diagnosis can be achieved in two different ways: measuring the host-specific immune response
to infection (e.g. IgM and IgG antibodies) and detection of viral particles (e.g. ReEBOV
Antigen Rapid Test Kit for VP40), or particle components in infected individuals (e.g. RT-
PCR or PCR). The most general assay used for IgM and IgG antibody detection are direct
ELISA assays. Table 1 illustrates recently manufactured kits and their corresponding assay
name or type. Considering the physiological kinetics of the humoral immune system as well
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as impaired antigen-presenting cell function as a result of viral hemorrhagic fever, antibody
titers are low in the early stages and often undetectable in severe patients prior to death
[6]. This leaves polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for antigen detection as a viable option for
early diagnostic assays. PCR is a chemical reaction that amplifies pieces of a virus’s genes
floating in the blood by more than a millionfold, which makes detection of pre-symptomatic
individuals likely identifiable. Indeed, a research article published in 2000, illustrates the
power of this technology to detect Ebola virus in humans in the pre-symptomatic stage [7].
In this study, 24 asymptomatic individuals who had been exposed to symptomatic Ebola
patients were tested using PCR. Eleven of the exposed patients eventually developed the
infection. Seven of the 11 tested positive for the PCR assay. And none of the other 13 did.
In this chapter, we extend the work presented in [13]. Here, we have developed and
analyzed a mathematical model to evaluate the impact of early diagnosis of pre-symptomatic
individuals on the transmission dynamics of Ebola virus disease in West Africa, under the
assumption that the disease is maintained possibly at very low levels due to the deficiencies
in health systems and our incomplete understanding of Ebola infection as illustrated by the
case of Pauline Cafferkey. Therefore, eliminating Ebola may require a more sustained and
long-term effort that requires the use of models that include vital dynamics.
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Table 1: Example of Ebola molecular assays and commercial lateral flow immunoassays.
PQ stards for prequalification.
Company Assay Name or Type Regulatory Status
Altona Diagnostics (Germany) Ebolavirus RT-PCR Kit 1.0 FDA Emergency Use
Roche (Switzerland) LightMix Modular Ebola Virus Zaire FDA EUA
CDC (USA) CDC Ebola NP Real-time RT-PCR FDA EUA
CDC (USA) CDC Ebola VP40 Real-time RT-PCR FDA EUA
US Department of Defense DoD EZ1 Real-time RT-PCR FDA EUA
BioMerieux (France) BioFire Defense FilmArray Biothreat-E test FDA EUA
Cepheid (USA) Xpert Ebola FDA EUA
Atomic Energy Commission (France) Ebola eZYSCREEN WHO PQ submitted
Chembio Diagnostics (USA) Lateral flow immunoassay WHO PQ submitted
Corgenix (USA) ReEBOV Antigen Rapid Test WHO PQ submitted
InTec (China) Lateral flow immunoassay WHO PQ submitted
Orasure (USA) Lateral flow immunoassay WHO PQ submitted
2 Model formulation
The total population is assumed to be classified into six mutually independent subgroups:
susceptible S(t), non-detectable latent E1(t), detectable latent E2(t), infectious I(t), isolated
J(t), and recovered R(t) individuals. Table 2 shows the state variables and their physical
meaning. The transition between all these states is shown in Figure 1. And model parameters
and their description are presented in Table 3. Parameter values have been obtained from
previous studies [16,17].
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It is assumed that individuals are recruited (either through birth or migration) into the
susceptible class at a rate Λ and die naturally with rate µ. Susceptible individuals get infected
due to successful contacts with infectious or not perfectly isolated infected individuals at rate
λ. As a consequence, they become latent undetectable, who develop their state of infection
to become latent detectable at rate κ1. We assume that the latent detectable class represent
individuals whose viral load is above the detection limit of the PCR-based diagnostic test
[7,11]. Latent detectable individuals either are diagnosed and get isolated with probability fT
or develop symptoms to become infectious, who sequentially either get isolated at rate α, or
are removed from the system by recovery or Ebola-induced death at rate γ. It is assumed here
that Ebola-induced deaths occur for the infectious individuals with probability q1. Similarly,
isolated individuals leave their class at rate γr, by either dying due to Ebola with probability
q2, or they get recovered and become immune. It is assumed that isolation is partially
effective so that successful contacts with susceptible individuals may lead to infection with
probability r; this parameter is a measure of isolation effectiveness of infectious individuals.
Thus, the force of infection is given by
λ(t) =
β[I(t) + (1− r)`J(t)]
N(t)− rJ(t) . (1)
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Figure 1: Compartmental model showing the transition between model states.
Table 2: Definition of model states.
Variable Description
S(t) Number of susceptible individuals at time t
E1(t) Number of latent undetectable individuals at time t
E2(t) Number of latent detectable individuals at time t
I(t) Number of infectious individuals at time t
J(t) Number of isolated individuals at time t
R(t) Number of recovered individuals at time t
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Table 3: Definition of Model Parameters.
Parameter Value Unit Description
Λ 17182 populationday Recruitment rate
β 0.3335 day−1 Mean transmission rate
µ 4.98× 10−5 day−1 Natural death rate
κ1 1/4 day
−1 Transition rate from undetectable to detectable latent state
κ2 1/3 day
−1 Exit rate of latent detectable individuals by either
becoming infectious or moving to isolation state
γ 1/6 day−1 Removal rate of infectious individuals by either recovery
or Ebola-induced death
γr 1/7 day
−1 Removal rate of isolated individuals by either recovery
or Ebola-induced death
α 1/5 day−1 Rate at which infectious individuals get isolated
fT 0.25 ∈ [0, 1] – Fraction of latent detectable individuals who are diagnosed
and get isolated
q1 0.7 – Probability that an infectious individual dies due to Ebola
q2 0.63 – Probability that an isolated individual dies due to Ebola
r 0.35 ∈ [0, 1] – Effectiveness of isolation
` 0.5 ∈ [0, 1] – Relative transmissibility of isolated individuals
with respect to infectious individuals
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The assumptions mentioned above lead to the following model of equations
dS
dt
= Λ− λS − µS,
dE1
dt
= λS − (κ1 + µ)E1,
dE2
dt
= κ1E1 − (κ2 + µ)E2,
dI
dt
= (1− fT )κ2E2 − (α + γ + µ)I, (2)
dJ
dt
= fTκ2E2 + αI − (γr + µ)J,
dR
dt
= (1− q1)γI + (1− q2)γrJ − µR
where
N(t) = S(t) + E1(t) + E2(t) + I(t) + J(t) +R(t)
is the total population size at time t. On adding all equations of system (2) together, we get
dN
dt
= Λ− µN − q1γI − q2γrJ. (3)
3 Model analysis
3.1 Basic properties
Since model (2) imitates the dynamics of human populations, all variables and parameters
should be non-negative. Thus, following the approach shown in appendix A of [8], we show
the following result.
Theorem 1. The variables of model (2) are non-negative for all time.
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Lemma 1. The closed set
Ω =
{
(S,E1, E2, I, J, R) ∈ R6+ :
Λ
µ+ q1γ + q2γr
≤ S + E1 + E2 + I + J +R ≤ Λ
µ
}
is positively invariant for model (2) and is absorbing.
Proof: Equation (3) implies that
dN
dt
≤ Λ− µN, (4)
dN
dt
≥ Λ− (µ+ q1γ + q2γr)N. (5)
It follows from (4) that
N(t) ≤ Λ
µ
+
(
N(0)− Λ
µ
)
e−µt (6)
and from (5) that
N(t) ≥ Λ
µ+ q1γ + q2γr
+
(
N(0)− Λ
µ+ q1γ + q2γr
)
e−(µ+q1γ+q2γr)t. (7)
If we assume N(0) > Λ/µ, then dN/dt < 0 and therefore (based on inequality (6)), N(t)
decreases steadily until reaching Λ/µ when t tends to ∞. Similarly, if we assume N(0) <
Λ/(µ + q1γ + q2γr), then dN/dt > 0 and therefore (based on inequality (7)), N(t) increases
steadily until reaching a maximum at Λ/(µ+ q1γ + q2γr) when t tends to ∞. It remains to
check the case if N(0) lies in the phase between Λ/(µ + q1γ + q2γr) and Λ/µ. To this end,
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both inequalities (6) and (7) are combined together to get
Λ
µ+ q1γ + q2γr
+
(
N(0)− Λ
µ+ q1γ + q2γr
)
e−(µ+q1γ+q2γr)t ≤ N(t) ≤ Λ
µ
+
(
N(0)− Λ
µ
)
e−µt.
On taking the limit when t tends to ∞, we find that N(t) remains within the same phase.
Thus, the set Ω is positively invariant and absorbing.
3.2 Equilibrium analysis
Ebola-free equilibrium and the control reproduction number Rc
It is easy to check that model (2) has the Ebola-free equilibrium
E0 =
(
Λ
µ
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)′
(8)
where the prime “ ′ ” means vector transpose.
The basic reproduction number, R0, is a measure of the average number of secondary
cases produced by a typical infectious individual during the entire course of infection in a
completely susceptible population and in the absence of control interventions [14,15]. On
the other hand, the control reproduction number, Rc, quantifies the potential for infec-
tious disease transmission in the context of a partially susceptible population due to the
implementation of control interventions. When Rc > 1, the infection may spread in the
population, and the rate of spread is higher with increasingly high values of Rc. If Rc < 1,
infection cannot be sustained and is unable to generate an epidemic. For our model, Rc is
computed using the next generation matrix approach shown in [9]. Accordingly, we compute
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the matrices F (for the new infection terms) and V (for the transition terms) as
F =

0 0 β (1− r)`β
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, V =

κ1 + µ 0 0 0
−κ1 κ2 + µ 0 0
0 −(1− fT )κ2 α + γ + µ 0
0 −fTκ2 −α γr + µ

.
Thus, the control reproduction number is given by
Rc = ρ(FV−1) = κ1κ2β[(1− fT )(µ+ γr) + (1− r)`(α + fT (γ + µ))]
(κ1 + µ)(κ2 + µ)(α + γ + µ)(γr + µ)
=
κ1κ2β
(κ1 + µ)(κ2 + µ)(α + γ + µ)
[
1− fT + (1− r)`
(
α
γr + µ
+ fT
γ + µ
γr + µ
)]
= R0
[
1− α
(α + γ + µ)
] [
1− fT + (1− r)`
(
α
γr + µ
+ fT
γ + µ
γr + µ
)]
(9)
where ρ is the spectral radius (dominant eigenvalue in magnitude) of the matrix FV−1 and
R0 = κ1κ2β
(κ1 + µ)(κ2 + µ)(γ + µ)
(10)
is the basic reproduction number for the model.
The local stability of the Ebola-free equilibrium, E0, for values of Rc < 1 is established
based on a direct use of Theorem 2 in [9]. We summarize our result in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The Ebola-free equilibrium E0 of model (2) is locally asymptotically stable if and
only if Rc < 1.
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Ebola-endemic equilibrium
On putting the derivatives in the left hand side of (2) equal zero and solving the resulting
algebraic system with respect to the variables S¯, E¯1, E¯2, I¯ , J¯ , and R¯, we obtain
S¯ =
Λ
λ¯+ µ
,
E¯1 =
Λ
λ¯+ µ
· λ¯
κ1 + µ
,
E¯2 =
κ1
κ2 + µ
· Λ
λ¯+ µ
· λ¯
κ1 + µ
,
I¯ =
(1− fT )κ2
α + γ + µ
· κ1
κ2 + µ
· Λ
λ¯+ µ
· λ¯
κ1 + µ
, (11)
J¯ =
κ1
κ2 + µ
· Λ
λ¯+ µ
· λ¯
κ1 + µ
· κ2
γr + µ
[
fT + (1− fT ) α
α + γ + µ
]
,
R¯ =
1
µ
[(1− q1)γI + (1− q2)γrJ ]
where
λ¯ =
β(I + (1− r)`J¯)
N¯ − rJ¯ (12)
is the equilibrium force of infection. On substituting from (11) into (12) and simplifying
(with the assumption that λ 6= 0), we get
λ¯ =
µ(Rc − 1)
1− Term (13)
where
Term =
κ1κ2[q1(1− fT )γ(γr + µ) + (rµ+ q2γr)(fT (γ + µ) + α)]
(κ1 + µ)(κ2 + µ)(α + γ + µ)(γr + µ)
.
Hence, the Ebola-endemic equilibrium is unique and we show the following lemma.
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Lemma 3. Model (2) has a unique endemic equilibrium that exists if and only if Rc > 1.
3.3 Normalized sensitivity analysis on Rc
In considering the dynamics of the Ebola system (2), we conduct normalized sensitivity
analysis on Rc to determine the impact of parameter perturbations on the transmission
dynamics of the system. By computing the normalized sensitivity indices, we consider the
percent change in the output with respect to a percent change in the parameter input. Those
parameters with the largest magnitude of change impact the compartment model the most;
the sign indicates whether the change produces an increase or a decrease on Rc.
The normalized sensitivity indices for Rc are calculated by taking the partial derivative
of Rc with respect to each parameter and multiply the derivative with the ratio of the pa-
rameter to Rc. This value represents the percent change in Rc with respect to a 1% change
in the parameter value [10].
Table 4: Percent change in Rc with respect to a 1% change in the parameter value, for a
low and a high isolation effectiveness r, and a low and a high value of fT , while keeping the
other parameter values as presented in Table 3.
Parameter β r ` γr γ α fT
% change 1% -0.23% 0.423% -0.423% -0.382% -0.195% -0.119%
fT = 0.25 for r = 0.35
% change 1% -1.014% 0.053% -0.053% -0.445% -0.501% -0.306%
for r = 0.95
% change 1% -0.402% 0.747% -0.747% -0.167% -0.086% -0.471%
fT = 0.75 for r = 0.35
% change 1% -3.521% 0.185% -0.185% -0.383% -0.431% -2.373%
for r = 0.95
We use the parameters values from Table 3 to study the sensitivity of Rc to each param-
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Figure 2: Percent change in Rc with respect to a 1% change in the parameter value, for a
low value of fT (fT = 0.25) and two different levels of isolation effectiveness (r = 0.35 and
r = 0.95). The other parameter values are kept as shown in Table 3.
eter. We compute normalized sensitivity analysis on all parameters, but we just consider
the impact of parameters that are the most sensitive: β, r, `, γr, γ, α, and fT . The other
parameters (µ, κ1, and κ2) have a very low impact, namely less than 0.001%. The numerical
simulations to the sensitivity of Rc with respect to each of the most sensitive parameters
are given in Table 4, for two different levels of isolation effectiveness (r = 0.35 and r = 0.95)
and two values of fT (fT = 0.25 and fT = 0.75), which is the fraction of pre-symptomatic
individuals diagnosed and isolated. The other parameter values are kept as shown in Table
3.
A graphical illustration of the numerical results for the scenario when fT = 0.25 and the
two levels of isolation effectiveness (r = 0.35 and r = 0.95) is given in Figure 2. In the case
of high isolation effectiveness (r = 0.95), simulations show that both the removal rate, γr, of
isolated individuals and the relative transmissibility parameter ` of isolated individuals with
respect to infectious individuals are the least sensitive parameters (with 0.053% change of
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Rc), while the parameter of isolation effectiveness, r, is the most sensitive one, where a 1%
increase in r causes a 1.014% reduction in the value of Rc. Also, the rate at which infectious
individuals get isolated, α, and the fraction of pre-symptomatic individuals detected and
isolated, fT , impact negatively on the level of Rc, where a 1% percent increase in the value
of fT causes approximately a 0.31% decline in the value of the reproduction number Rc.
Thus, as pre-symptomatic individuals are diagnosed and as isolation is highly effective, the
number of available infectious individuals who are capable of transmitting Ebola decreases
and therefore, the reproduction number decreases. Also, the removal (by recovery or Ebola-
induced death) rate γ of infectious individuals affects negatively on Rc. Hence, for the case
of highly effective isolation, the parameters concerning early diagnosis and isolation have a
significant impact on the reproduction number.
This percent impact of the parameters on Rc remains so as long as isolation is highly
effective. However, if the effectiveness of isolation is low, in the sense that all parameter
values are kept the same except the value of the parameter r, which is reduced to 0.35, then
we get the results presented in Table 4 and Figure 2. In this case, both the relative trans-
missibility ` and the removal rate of isolated individuals, γr, are the second most sensitive
parameters, after β which is the most impactful one. Also, ` became more sensitive than
r. The implication is that, when isolation is less effective, there exists the possibility for
isolated people to make successful contacts with susceptible individuals and therefore the
possibility of causing new infections increases. This causes an increase in the reproduction
number. Also, it is noted that the effect of fT and α is reduced, which means that diagnosing
and isolating infected individuals becomes a weak strategy if the effectiveness of isolation is
low.
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Figure 3: Percent change in Rc with respect to a 1% change in the parameter value, for a
high value of fT (fT = 0.75) and two different levels of isolation effectiveness (r = 0.35 and
r = 0.95). The other parameter values are kept as shown in Table 3.
On repeating the previous analyses, but this time for a higher value of fT (fT = 0.75),
we obtain the results shown in Table 4, which are also illustrated in Figure 3. In comparison
to the scenario when fT = 0.25, the simulations show that increasing the fraction of pre-
symptomatic individuals who are diagnosed and isolated, fT , increases the percent impact
of the parameters r, `, γr, and fT , and decreases the percent impact of the parameters γ and
α, on the value of the control reproduction number Rc.
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3.4 Impact of early detection and isolation on the value of Rc
Figure 4: Impact of early detection of pre-symptomatic individuals on the value of Rc.
To study the impact of early detection of pre-symptomatic individuals and isolation on the
reproduction number, we first depict Rc as a function of fT , for different levels of isola-
tion effectiveness r. Figure 4 shows that the control reproduction number declines as the
proportion, fT , of pre-symptomatic individuals, who get diagnosed and isolated, increases.
Simulations are done using parameter values from Table 3, but for three different values
of r. It further shows that the curve corresponding to a low and an intermidate value of
isolation effectivenes r (e.g. r = 0.35 for the solid curve and r = 0.65 for the dashed curve)
hits Rc = 1 at some critical value of fT (say f ?T ), while for the high value of r (r = 0.95), it
never hits the critical threshold Rc = 1, as the curve is totally below the critical threshold.
This indicates that for a high effectiveness of isolation, the control reproduction number is
less than one and therefore the infection dies out. Analytically, the exact form of f ?T is
f ?T =
[
1 + (1− r)` α
γr + µ
− 1R0
(
1 +
α
γ + µ
)]
/
[
1− (1− r)`(γ + µ)
γr + µ
]
. (14)
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The critical proportion f ?T represents the minimum proportion of pre-symptomatic individ-
uals who are detected and get isolated to ensure an effective control of Ebola. This critical
value remains feasible as long as the following inequality holds
(1− r)` < γr + µ
(γ + µ)R0 . (15)
If we keep all parameters fixed except r, then condition (15) could be rewritten in a more
convenient form
r > 1− γr + µ
`(γ + µ)R0 . (16)
This gives the minimum level of effectiveness of isolation required to obtain an isolation and
early diagnosis-based control strategy for Ebola tranmission.
Figure 5: Impact of isolating infectious individuals on the value of Rc.
Now, we could also ask a similar question on the role of isolating infectious individuals
to contain Ebola transmission. Figure 5 shows the impact of changing the rate at which
infectious individuals get isolated, α, on Rc, for the same three different levels of isolation
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effectivenes, as used above. The analysis shows that it is possible to control the epidemic if
and only if α > α?, where
α? =
[(1− fT )(γr + µ)(γ + µ) + (1− r)`fT (γ + µ)2]R0 − (γr + µ)(γ + µ)
(γr + µ)− `(1− r)R0(γ + µ) (17)
and with the implementation of condition (15).
4 Discussion and conclusion
The Ebola epidemic has shown us major weaknesses not only in health systems in West
Africa, but also in our global capacity to respond early to an outbreak with effective diag-
nositc capacities. After multiple outbreaks of infectious diseases, from severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS) to Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV),
we still do not have effective diagnostic tools to rapidly respond to a number of potential
epidemics. The main reason why we lack of such diagnostic preparedness against infectious
diseases is because of the lack of a financed global strategy that can be implemented ahead,
rather than during an epidemic. This strategy must primarily focus on two critical aspects:
First, a continuous intereaction between the field to detect small outbreaks and collect sam-
ples, and reference laboratories with advanced sequencing tools to identify the pathogen.
Second, the need of assay development for early diagnosis, their regulatory approval, and a
plan of implementation in anticipation of an outbreak.
Here, motivated by some studies showing that PCR assay can detect Ebola virus in both hu-
mans and non-human primates during the pre-symptomatic stage [7,11], we have developed
and analyzed a mathematical model calibrated to the transmission dynamics of Ebola virus
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disease in West Africa to evaluate the impact of early diagnosis of pre-symptomatic infec-
tions. In the absence of effective treatments and vaccines, our results show the importance of
implementing integrated control measures of early diagnosis and isolation. Importantly, our
analysis identifies a threshold where early diagnosis of pre-symptomatic individuals, com-
bined with a sufficient level of effective isolation, can lead to an epidemic control of Ebola
virus disease. Furthermore, the need to incorporate vital dynamics is justified by our still
limited understanding of Ebola infection including whether or not Ebola virus may persist
among recovered individuals. The use of Rc in this context reflect our view that control
measures should be sustainable and not just in response to an outbreak.
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